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Abstract 
 Author understands humanity as all the forms of behaviour leading to the protection 
and maintenance, i.e. development of human life. On the basis of the differences in the 
objects of our behaviour and conduct, he distinguishes between humanity as a natural-
biological quality and a cultural (moral) quality. The moral value of the first kind of 
behaviour is determined by our biological or social relations to our close ones. In the second 
case, the moral value of our behaviour to strangers is a pure manifestation of our morality and 
culture. 
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Introduction 
 Contemporary genetics, neurology, biology, zoology, ethology, etc., present ever-new 
knowledge of genetic similarity between humans and the animal realm; the similarity 
between human brain activity and behaviour or conduct and the brain activity and behaviour 
of many representatives of the animal realm, especially primates or mammals, but also some 
other kinds of animals.  
 Paola Cavalieri holds the opinion that contemporary scientific knowledge shows that 
there is no reason for the existence of a categorical difference between humans and non-
humans. The decoding of genome of humans and other animal species has proved quite 
clearly the existence of evolutionary continuity between the humankind and other animal 
species. Thus, according to her, moral philosophers are not right if they still persist in 
claiming the moral superiority of the human species.115 Theresa S. S. Schilhab holds a similar 
position when stating that contemporary empirical research rejects the preference of the 
contrast between the humans and apes capable of self-reflection and the mentally inferior 
animals lacking the concept of Self.116 On the basis of the examination of the similarities in 
human and animal behaviour, Marc Bekoff has concluded that humans are not necessarily 
morally superior to animals.117 
 So, is humanity a specifically human quality that separated man from nature; by 
which man overcame his animality, i.e. his biological and natural determination, as Kant 
expressed it? And what is actually humanity?  
 
A Concept of Humanity 
 According to common sense morality, we often understand humanity, on the one 
hand, as the respect for, and acceptance of human being, and, on the other hand, as the 
support of the effort to develop its strengths and abilities. Let us think about these individual 
aspects of humanity and decide to what extent it is really possible to perceive them as 
adequately expressing the meaning of the concept of humanity. On the common sense 
                                                          
115 Cavalieri 2002, pp. 78-79. 
116 Schilhab 2004, p. 123. 
117 Bekoff 2004, pp. 515-516; 2006, p. 80. 
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morality level humanity is first of all the respect for human being. It means that in the case of 
others we respect their ontological or metaphysical status of human beings, i.e. that they are 
above all the bearers of the morphological signs belonging to human being (physiological 
similarity with people). This results in the duty to behave towards them as to the members of 
the same species; that is as to the beings that are equal to us. In the case of the support of 
efforts at the development of someone’s powers and abilities it usually means the creation of 
the economic, social, mental, cultural, intellectual, educational and professional conditions 
for this human being’s achievement of full development. 
 Taking into account only the points made so far, we could conclude that our respect 
for the newborn, our satisfaction of its needs, its rearing and education is nothing unique, 
nothing that is only characteristic of human species. A very similar, in some cases almost 
identical, behaviour can also be found in animal species, especially mammals. We could pose 
a question whether such behaviour in people is a sign of humanity at all since the existence of 
this behaviour in the animal realm indicates that it rather has biological than purely moral or 
cultural (including professional) roots that could be used as evidence of our own uniqueness. 
Michael Stingl and John Collier hold an opinion that affection and the partial relationships 
that are built on it create a basic feature of human life, as well as the life of other primates. 
Then, in their opinion, we can suppose that these partial relationships will play a very 
important role in the theory of moral capacity based on evolutionary biology. 118 
 Let us think what could be a really unique, completely specific feature of behaviour in 
people as the members of the same species that does not exist in the behaviour of the 
members of the rest of the animal realm?  On what basis could we speak of humanity as a 
moral value having its origin and source not in the biological or natural, but in cultural 
evolution? The initial thesis of our thinking about humanity, i.e. humanity as the respect for 
human life, appears to be more a natural or biological than solely moral (or professional) 
factor. Undoubtedly, it is true that morality has its biological basis related above all to the 
value of human life. 119 Bekoff believes that the origin of virtue and morality is older that 
human species.120 However, if we want to emphasize our uniqueness, or difference from the 
rest of the animal realm, we have to find something typically human in the behaviour of 
people, something that we could use as the basis for the value of humanity. What could that 
be?  
 The criteria of human life can be biological, social and mental qualities or capacities 
of human being. The biological qualities especially include the already mentioned 
morphological and functional signs. The social capacities comprise speech and 
communication capacity and the capacity to form certain social contacts, interpersonal 
relationships, mobility of an individual, the ability to take care of oneself, moral as well as 
professional judgement and the ability to plan the future. The mental qualities and capacities 
include, in our opinion, the existence of consciousness, self-awareness, abstract thinking, free 
will, moral and professional thinking. These criteria comprise the objectively existing 
qualities, capacities of human being, i.e. their presence or absence, and not their quality or 
quantity. The minimal criteria for the definition of the real human life, as different from the 
pure vegetative state of human organism, have to comprise at least some social and mental 
qualities or capacities. If a human life does not comprise any of the social and mental 
qualities or capacities, it only exists on the biological level of human organism and it can be 
treated accordingly in an effort at its maintenance.  
 Another frequently mentioned aspect of humanity defined as a moral value is that 
man helps another man either with the realization of his goals and intentions or in the case of 
                                                          
118 Stingl and Collier 2005, pp. 14-15. 
119 Bekoff 2004; Ridley 1996, 2001; Ruse 1998; Waller 1997; Wright 1994. 
120 Bekoff 2004, pp. 515-516. 
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his misery, or suffering. Are these uniquely human forms of behaviour or can they also be 
found in the animal realm? If we think about the help with the realization of goals and 
intentions, we can find something similar in the animal realm in the case of the cooperation 
of various members of the same species during hunting. We could point out that while man 
can help the other person unselfishly, animals cooperate in hunting to acquire food in an 
easier way. A sceptic could claim that even altruistic behaviour of people is not completely 
unselfish since what these people acquire is at least the good feeling that they helped 
someone and that is the sole reason why they do it. According to sceptics, only the conduct 
based on the Kantian pure duty, which excludes any empirical explanation of why we 
perform the duty, can be accepted as purely unselfish and altruistic. Despite these objections 
of the sceptics, we can probably perceive altruistic help with the realization of others’ goals 
and intentions as something that goes beyond the limits of the purely biological or natural 
dimension of our behaviour and conduct. It is especially true if this altruistic help is given to 
strangers since this feature of behaviour does not exist in the animal realm. Humans can offer 
assistance to the strangers that they meet in the street, if they need it, or to the strangers in 
foreign countries, whom they will never meet, if they need aid because of wars or natural 
disasters that struck the given part of the world.121 In this case we can state that it is a form of 
behaviour of man towards another man that transcends the natural dimension and is a result 
of the cultural evolution, including the moral and professional development. A sceptic can 
argue that this aid is usually provided on the international level and that it can include also 
motives that may not be completely unselfish and spontaneous. This can be true, but what I 
have in mind is the behaviour of the individuals who help others independently from state 
institutions and with the intention to help the people who need it. An example can be the aid 
provided for the countries and people suffering the aftermath of earthquakes or floods, but 
also the aid provided for the children in foster homes. Such behaviour is exclusively human 
and that is why we can perceive it as a manifestation of humanity, as a moral value that 
humanity comprises.                   
 However, what about the conduct or help based on the expected reciprocity? Can we 
also say that such conduct transcends our natural or biological frame and results from our 
cultural evolution? Can we say that such conduct corresponds with the moral and 
professional dimension of humanity? Can reciprocity be found in relations among animals? 
Certainly we can find it in members of the same species, especially if they belong to the same 
herd, flock, or pack.122 In no case it is something that we can perceive as calculative 
behaviour, as it is usually called if it appears in human relationships, but it is something quite 
natural in the animal relations because it is expected that every member take part in the 
maintaining of the life of the herd, flock or pack. A lot of biologists speak in this respect 
about so called reciprocal altruism, according to which animals in danger try to save, or 
protect the members of their herd, flock or pack against predators by drawing attention to 
themselves, so that others could escape safely.123 This even leads to show that also in the 
animal realm there exists the self-sacrifice for the good of others of the same species that are 
members of the same herd, flock or pack. Consequently, not even man’s capacity for self-
sacrifice for the good of others is a completely human quality. Despite the positive value that 
it comprises, it cannot be considered a typically human quality that is a result of cultural 
evolution and a purely moral factor. Rather the contrary is true. It becomes clearer and clearer 
                                                          
121 For clarification, and the preservation of the continuity of the text, I want to explain that in the following 
pages the concept ‘stranger’ will be used in the above-defined meaning.   
122 Boesch 2002; Schuster 2002. 
123 for the discussion about the altruism of humans and animals see, for example, Brosnan and de Waal 2002; 
Collier and Stingl 1993; Dawkins 1976; Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter 2002; Hill 2002; Narveson 2000; Price 
2003; Ridley 1996, 2001; Rottschaefer 1998; Stich 2007; Wilson, E. 2004; Wright 1994. 
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that a lot of manifestations of human behaviour that we intuitively or on the common sense 
morality basis consider human are results of biological or natural evolution and they also 
exist in members of other animal species. Michael Ruse believes that the features of altruistic 
behaviour akin to moral behaviour can also be found in higher primates.124 Similarly, Lang 
and Sober and Strier conclude that if we accept man or human species as part of nature, then 
we have to accept that a number of manifestations of human behaviour are comparable with 
the manifestations of behaviour in other species, although there can exist qualitative 
variability. 125 On the other hand, for example, Catherine Wilson states that behaviour of 
animals, including the socially living ones, as e.g. ants or chimpanzees, is not moral, although 
in many cases they behave comparably to humans. According to her, we cannot ascribe to 
them any moral beliefs or agency. In her opinion, despite the existence of the cooperation 
among animals, we cannot call their society moral because our idea of morality is based on 
the ability to abstract and generalize.126 However, Marc Bekoff believes that we can find in 
animals such manifestations of behaviour that evidently have a moral dimension, e.g. 
honesty. In his opinion a lot of animals, especially mammals, have the sense of honesty 
because it helps them survive in their environment.127        
 If we are to summarize the so far developed ideas about humanity, then we have to 
state that a great majority of the manifestations of man’s behaviour that we usually call 
humane have mainly biological or natural dimension that we have in common with other 
animal species, especially mammals and primates. These manifestations of behaviour include 
the ones that are related to the protection and maintenance of our own life, the life of our 
children, relatives, friends and acquaintances. In relation to these people (if we respect and 
support their lives, interests and goals) we behave essentially in the same way as members of 
various animal species, especially mammals and primates, behave towards their close ones. 
Such behaviour, despite the fact that it is very needed and desired, can in no case be seen as 
uniquely human; as something that can create a basis for the humankind’s claim to a special 
status in relation to other mammals and primates. The basis of our behaviour is biological or 
natural. People, however, ascribed a moral value to it and it could be discussed whether it 
was right. Specifically human behaviour that is not based on biological or natural but 
exclusively moral basis is our behaviour related to the protection of variously disabled forms 
of human life. It refers in the same way to our behaviour towards strangers if it is aimed at the 
protection and maintenance of their life, property, physical, mental and professional integrity, 
their goals and intentions helping to protect and maintain life. 
 Consequently, we can try to conclude the so far presented thinking about humanity 
and on this basis define the active and passive forms of the realization of humanity. The 
active form means the direct involvement of moral agent through his participation in the 
activity developed for the benefit of the strangers in need of help. The passive form of the 
realization of humanity means that our behaviour expresses our compassion with the 
strangers affected by disaster. Especially in the case of the latter form an important role is 
played by moral feelings. Usually this passive form of humanity forms the basis, or is the 
condition for the realization of the active form of humanity, i.e. for the providing of 
assistance to those people who need it. Compassion with the suffering often (though not 
always) leads to the acting for the benefit of these people. Of course, the active help is always 
more valuable than mere compassion, but we should not minimize the value or potential of 
the humanity comprising compassion. Our capacity to forgive comprises a similar potential 
of being humane. Forgiveness, just like compassion, can be the initial point for our further 
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acting, the active realization of humanity in the form of assistance to others. The passive 
humanity can also be reflected in not acting, i.e. not causing harm to other person despite the 
fact that the moral agent could do it while realizing his rightful intentions and goals. This 
passive form of humanity can be seen as a certain minimal level of humanity related to the 
fact that if the moral agent cannot help other man, he at least expresses his compassion, or at 
least does not act in the way that could harm the other in the realization of his rightful 
intentions and aims. The active form of the realization of humanity can be divided into 
positive and negative. The positive form means a direct assistance to a stranger who needs it 
in the realization of his positive intentions and goals. The negative formulation means to 
prevent other person from the realization of harmful aims, intentions that could affect some 
stranger.     
 My thinking, developed so far, has brought me to the conclusion that it is possible to 
respect humanity from the metaphysical or ontological perspective, i.e. to perceive someone 
as a human being on the basis of his morphological and functional signs belonging to human 
beings. This, however, does not say anything about the moral or professional aspect of 
humanity. We can only latently create conditions for the formulation of a definition of the 
moral value of humanity. From the ethical, moral or professional perspective, humanity has 
to be realized and not only respected because it implies acting to the benefit of the strangers 
in need. It is latently present also in the passive form of humanity, i.e. in the feeling of 
compassion with the suffering or misfortune of strangers or in the case of forgiving someone. 
The moral and professional value of humanity can be realized only through our behaviour 
and conduct in relation to strangers. 
 I think that we have to distinguish between the generic behaviour and conduct of 
humans that, despite having a biological-natural basis, also comprises positive moral 
dimension related to the protection and maintenance of human life from the behaviour that 
too has a biological-natural basis, but comprises a negative moral dimension. In the animal 
realm the protection and maintenance of life, on the one hand, or its destruction, on the other 
hand, have no moral dimension, or effect. Both manifestations of behaviour, protective and 
destructive, are the natural manifestations of animal behaviour and do not evoke any wider 
reaction among the members of the animal realm. Their effect is temporary and impact 
limited to the local area. In the case of human society the reaction to such behaviour is wider 
and, owing to the media, can cross the local borders in which certain kind of behaviour 
happened very quickly, especially if this behaviour represses or destroys human lives.     
 That is why I suggest that we speak about humanity in all the cases in which human 
life is protected and maintained (including professional life) since it brings positive 
consequences for human life; with the specification that if it is the protection and 
maintenance of one’s own life, the lives of our close ones, friends or acquaintances, it is the 
humanity based on a biological-natural foundation that, however, has also its moral as well as 
professional dimension and effect. On the contrary, the manifestations of the protection and 
maintenance of life in relation to strangers represent the real moral and professional value of 
humanity, i.e. they are the results of our cultural evolution, our moral and professional 
development. In this way we accept all the positive manifestations of our behaviour in 
relation to other people. Especially, we emphasize the value of helping, the protection and 
maintenance of the handicapped forms of human life and the strangers who need it because 
such behaviour transcends our biological-natural dimension, or the basis that we have in 
common with many other representatives of the animal realm.128  
                                                          
128 Bruce N. Waller in this respect speaks about the morality of care and the morality of duty. In his opinion, 
human rationalistic morality is an improved animal morality of care. Ethics of care is in its essence valid 
because affection, care, trust and generosity form a moral basis. The attitude based on rational principles is an 
important means of the widening, improving and supporting of moral behaviour when affection reaches its 
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 In the first case we understand humanity as a generic, natural-biological, quality 
typical of the behaviour of the members of human species, while in the second case we 
understand it as a moral as well as professional quality, which despite having features of 
similarity with the first quality, differs in respect to the object of its realization. Despite the 
fact that in the first case we understand humanity as a biological-natural quality of man, this 
understanding of humanity cannot be identified with the biologism of humanity because my 
understanding of humanity is related only to the behaviour leading to the protection and 
maintenance of human life. If this understanding of humanity is not to be influenced by 
speciesism, then we have to accept that in the animal realm, especially in mammals and 
primates, the protection and maintenance of one’s own life, the life of offspring and other 
members of the herd, flock or pack is a natural-biological quality typical of their species, and 
that we can call it animality and see it as equal in its forms or manifestations of behaviour to 
humanity as a natural-biological but not moral quality typical of human species.       
 To summarize our points, we can state that humanity is understood as all the forms of 
behaviour leading to the protection and maintenance, i.e. development of human life 
(including professional life). On the basis of the differences in the objects of our behaviour 
and conduct, we distinguish between humanity as a natural-biological quality and a moral 
quality. The moral value of the first kind of behaviour is determined by our biological or 
social relations to our close ones. In the second case, the moral and professional value of our 
behaviour to strangers is a pure manifestation of our morality. In the first case the protection 
and the maintenance of life is a result of our basic value orientation, including our moral 
values that result from this orientation. In the second case our behaviour and conduct for the 
benefit of strangers brings an additional moral and professional value. The basic form of 
humanity resides, then, in the protection and maintenance of one’s own life and the lives of 
our close ones, relatives, friends and acquaintances. It is the alpha and omega of our 
behaviour, which creates the basic natural-biological framework for our morality. It also 
creates the foundation for the basic rights and duties related to the protection and 
maintenance of human life. On the other hand, the protection and maintenance of the life of 
strangers is the moral and also professional surplus value by which we create a new, higher 
quality in our behaviour in relation to other people. In this case we can really speak about 
humanity as a moral and professional quality, or value. It is something that is really 
specifically human and which deserves respect and admiration. By such behaviour man 
proves that he can, at least to certain extent, transcend the natural-biological framework of his 
determination. 
  
Conclusion 
 This can be achieved through the moral principles and particular moral as well as 
professional norms that define some ways of pursuing humanity in the individual and social 
life of moral communities (including professional life). I do not think that humanity as a 
moral quality is unachievable and abstract moral ideal that is too far from moral practice of 
the moral agents. I mean that humanity as an additional moral and professional value is the 
expression of actual requirements and interests of the individuals and humankind in general. 
Human beings hope for their rational existence and survival through the application of 
humanity, its principles and respect for human dignity. Human existence also depends on the 
solution of environmental issues which represents an external condition for the preservation 
of human life in general. However, what is important is the fact that the moral agent should 
try to perform humanity in his life.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
limits. The moral basis of the morality of duty resides in care and affection. The affection is rooted in biology, 
supported by direct and indirect reciprocity and exists prior to rationality. The rational morality of duty is an 
adaptive complement of the morality based on affection and care (Waller 1997, pp. 353-354).     
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 Humanity is one of the most significant moral and professional principles on which 
the human society is based as a society of the co-operating individuals (including professional 
life). We can see that the future of humankind is possible only if we accept and apply the 
principle of humanity as one of the fundamental principles. There are not only the basic 
duties of mankind towards the preservation of the future existence of humankind, but there is 
also a danger of the environmental disaster. It is so urgent that it is necessary to overcome 
narrow anthropological views on the future of the world and its life.   
 The idea of the preservation of human existence must be associated with the respect 
for and the application of humanity as moral and professional quality and it is only possible 
response to the future of humankind. The international co-operation of states and nations is 
the means of fulfilling humanity in ordinary life of the individual and whole human society 
(including professional life). The co-operation brings a perspective of preservation of human 
life. One of the most significant conclusions of this reasoning is an idea that the meaningful 
existence of the moral agents, communities and whole humankind is possible only through 
acceptance and application of humanity. I do not think that it is an abstract and unachievable 
goal for most people during their lives. To respect and apply humanity in our lives, we do not 
need necessarily be the saints. Being human is enough. That is why I think we can justify the 
attribute human and moral being by our action regardless the unfavourable character of 
contemporary period which perhaps tend to stimulate opposite position. Despite this, I think 
no other alternative than the acceptance and application of humanity in the world is possible. 
 I conclude with Thomas Garique Masaryk’s quotation: “[H]umanistic ideal, 
[authentic] humaneness, is the foundation of all strivings of our time-particularly those that 
prevail at present in our national life. It is this which Kollár means when he says: ‘When you 
cry, Slav, may it always mean Man’”.129  
 This paper is supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency, contract 
No. APVV-0432-10. 
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